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This paper addresses the question of tax competition in Europe from a non-normative 
standpoint.  While  most of the existing work adopts a non-cooperative approach, the 
choice is made here to consider a cooperative game with prior commitments in order to   4
capture the tacit coordination, or at least the sharing of signals, that occur in many 
European instances. From a theoretical perspective, the cooperative approach 
complements previous approaches based on non-cooperative game theory. From a 
practical perspective, it helps capture the importance of initial conditions, for instance 
rigidities in political decision making or taxation policies. 
One example of a European institution in which some coordination occurs is the Eco-Fin, 
where Finance ministers meet, exchange information, and make “soft” agreements about 
their respective policies. Yet this is not a real coordination mechanism insofar as there are 
no binding agreements and ministers can change their policies as soon as they are back in 
their respective countries. Prior commitments that may occur in such institutions can only 
be partial and are considered as such in our model. 
Over the years, the European Commission, and more g enerally European Institutions, 
have recommended a coordinated action against tax competition in Europe. The objective 
of such coordination is reducing distortions still existent within the single market, while 
also avoiding losses  in  tax receipts—that is to avoid a “race to the bottom”. Some 
practical steps have been taken in that respect: 
1.  The Eco-Fin Council of December 1, 1997 gave its assent to a code of conduct in 
the field of companies’ taxation. 
2.  In June 2000, the European Council finally agreed to a compromise with respect 
to taxes on savings, whereby European countries have to inform other countries 
about savings made by residents from other member states. Yet, a transition 
period of 7 years was established during which a minimum common tax rate of 
15% until 2004, then 20% until the end of 2009, applies.   5
3.  To avoid growing differences between the Value-Added Tax (VAT) standard 
rates between Member States, supposedly leading to structural imbalances in the 
EU, and distortions of competition in some sectors, it has been agreed that, until 
31 December 2005, the standard rate must remain above 15% (Directive 
2001/41/CE of 19.01.2001 – OJ L 22, 24.1.2001). The European Commission has 
also presented a proposal relating to the scope of reduced rates in order to 
simplify the rules in this area, and to achieve a more uniform application of the 
tax. The objective is to give Member States equal opportunities to apply reduced 
rates in some sectors (e.g., restaurants, housing, gas and electricity and home care 
services), and is also intended to rationalize the many VAT rate derogations 
currently available to individual Member States. 
The danger of a possible race to the bottom that could result from tax competition 
between countries is one of the main reasons why tax harmonization in Europe is often 
advocated. In such a case, countries would not likely end up with a zero tax rate, but with 
“too low” a tax rate. The main consequence of such a tax rate may be the un-
sustainability of public spending that could push countries into some financial turmoil. 
Hence, the recommendation at both the European Union (EU) institutional level and in 
the economic literature is for some harmonization of national tax policies (Razin and 
Sadka, 1991), or some form of coordination of tax policy between national authorities 
(Frenkel, et al., 1991, Persson and Tabellini, 1995, Rodrik and van Ypersele, 2001, 
Turnovsky, 1997). 
A very illustrative paper from Mendoza and Tesar (2005) tries to tackle this type of issue 
in a new way. Yet the authors do not address directly the question about “why” there may   6
or may not be a race to the bottom. Their panel data analysis addresses the following 
question: can a race to the bottom be the outcome of tax competition? Their findings 
suggest that firstly, there is no evidence of a race to the bottom, and secondly, “countries 
with relatively inefficient tax systems can experience significant welfare losses if, as a 
byproduct of financial integration, they find themselves competing over capital income 
taxes against countries with relatively efficient tax systems. (…) Harmonization of 
taxation on immobile factors, and freedom to adjust consumption taxes to make up for 
the tax revenue lost to capital income tax competition would be far more desirable.” 
A race to the bottom in public finance is a good illustration of the cobweb model in 
microeconomics: a slight deviation from the initial equilibrium leads to an explosive 
situation with no return to the equilibrium. There is no way to know ex ante whether the 
deviation is temporary or looks like an unstable cobweb. Tax competition in Europe does 
not seem to have pushed countries into an unstable cobweb pattern, although we can 
observe changes in taxation policies. 
Before presenting our model, it is necessary to examine the most important facts about 
taxation in Europe. If a race to the bottom had happened, the total tax burden of the Euro 
area as a whole, or at least for some countries, might have decreased. The evolution of 
taxes on mobile and immobile assets may also reflect international competition.  
Based on the OECD Revenue Statistics database (2004), the total tax burden in % GDP 
for the whole Euro area and per country is presented respectively in Figure 1 and Figure 
2. The total tax burden is the sum of taxes on corporate income, personal income, 
consumption, property, and social security contributions. Quadratic fitted curves with a 
95% confidence interval are also presented in order to extract the trend from the data.    7
For the Euro area (Figure 1), the trend of the total tax burden has been increasing from 
1965 to about the end of the 1990s. Since then, it has been relatively stable (with an 
increase in the current tax burden in 2002). At the beginning of the 21st century the level 
of the total tax burden as a % of GDP is about 10 points higher than the middle of the 
1960s. 
 































































































Source: OECD  (2004) and own calculations. 
 
The red vertical lines represent the beginning of the official economic convergence 
period (1993) and the introduction of the Euro (1999).  As far as the various m ember 
states are concerned (Figure 2), the total tax burden has increased almost continuously   8
from 1965 to 2003 for all countries, (except for The Netherlands and Ireland,) and to a 
lesser extent for Luxembourg, Italy, Germany, and France. (For Germany and France the 
decreases have been recent developments). The decreases in Ireland and the Netherlands 
are quite significant from about the second part of the 1980s to the beginning of the 
2000s. Noticeably, the trend for Greece captured by the quadratic fitted curve is the only 
one with a convex shape, indicating acceleration in the growth rate of the total tax 
burden. 
 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: OECD (2004) and own calculations. 
 
Taxes on mobile and immobile assets are differentiated following Benassy-Quere, et al. 
(2000). Taxes on immobile assets are measured by the sum of personal income tax, social 
contributions of employees, consumption tax, and property tax. Taxes on mobile assets 
are the sum of corporate income tax and social contributions by employers. 
Taxes on immobile assets for the Euro area as a whole (Figure 3), have increased from 
1965 until the middle of the 1990s, and have started decreasing since then. Taxes on 
mobile assets (Figure 3) have also increased until the late 1980’s, remained relatively 
steady until the first half of the 1990s, and increased slightly again until 2003. Most 
importantly, there is no evidence for the Euro average of a substitution of taxes on 
immobile assets for taxes on mobile assets; such a substitution could have been a sign of 
a race to the bottom due to tax competition on mobile assets.   11
 
























































































































Source: OECD (2004) and own calculations. 
 
Yet, even without this substitution for the Euro area as a whole, there may exist 
substitution for some specific countries. Figure 4 (mobile and immobile taxes for each 
member state) shows that such an event did not happen. 
   12






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: OECD (2004) and own calculations.   14
 
It would appear, on the contrary, that both components have a tendency to move in the 
same direction, not in opposite directions as substitution would imply. The exception is 
that for very short periods of time (for example, The Netherlands by the end of the 
1990s,) a decrease in the immobile tax burden was associated with an increase in the 
mobile part, the reverse of what could be expected from a race to the bottom!
1 
When one looks at the fitted values curves and their concavity/convexity in figure 4, two 
countries show evidence of a substitution effect from taxes on immobile assets to taxes 
on mobile assets: Finland and Ireland. The evidence is even more noticeable for Ireland.   
These data suggest that a race to the bottom did not really exist during the period under 
consideration. Yet, the same facts do not guarantee that a race to the bottom may not 
happen in the future, especially with the higher integration that the European monetary 
Union (EMU) seeks to create over time. How can we analyze this possibility? 
In addition to existing econometric papers on the topic (for instance Devereux, et al., 
2002), a  game theoretical approach  is a useful way to deal with the question. 
Conceptually, a race to the bottom game is related to a potential future result. In other 
words, one cannot, ex ante, decide whether a race to the bottom is in the process of 
occurring, or similarly, that a race to the bottom might occur, even though taxes might be 
decreasing. One cannot discard the possibility either. What must be considered is the 
likelihood of such a critical game to the bottom. By nature, a race to the bottom is a 
                                                 
1 About the same observation can be made about Ireland from 1988 onwards, in spite of a diminution of the 
corporate tax rate by 1998. In Ireland, in 1998, manufacturing companies have in general been eligible to a 
lower corporate tax rate: 10% from 1998 to January 1, 2003, and 12.5% since then, even if the normal 
corporate tax rate remained at 40%. For eligible companies, the 12.5% rate is maintained until the year 
2010. Yet, as shown later, this change in policy does not appear to explain the decrease in the total tax 
burden.   15
theoretical assumption; it is an extreme scenario, whose final outcome is the countries’ 
insolvency  (Lopez, et al., 1996), i.e., countries cannot raise enough revenue to pay for 
their public expenditure. Game theory is a good method to deal with such a situation. It is 
also a good method to deal with political decisions made by governments, be they taken 
in coordination with other countries or not,, that may trigger a race to the bottom. As in 
Wildasin (2001) this is done via the modeling of countries’ interaction. This explains why 
this paper proposes a cooperative game to answer this question. In other words, a game 
theoretical model is a good theoretical answer to the theoretical assumption of a war of 
attrition. 
Within this framework we cam answer whether  a race to the bottom through tax 
competition is possible,and under what conditions such a race would occur? 
The model illustrates a race to the bottom game with a bargaining situation and costs of 
changing tax policies. No uncertainty exists in terms of tax policies implemented. The 
analysis is designed to explore the role of commitment tactics on the outcome of a 
bargaining process between two governments. 
After this introduction (Section 1), Section 2 presents and analyses the model. Section 3 
concludes and sets forth some policy implications based upon our findings.  
   16
2. The model 
 
2.1 The hypotheses 
 
The model of this paper is a bargaining game with possibilities of a race to the bottom. 
The bargaining process is used as a proxy to capture, in a theoretical way, tax 
competition in practice. 
In many bargaining situations, the countries involved often take actions prior to, and/or 
during the negotiation process, that partially commit themselves to some strategically 
chosen bargaining positions. Such commitments are still considered partial in the sense 
that they are revocable. But revoking a partial commitment can be costly. If this cost is 
higher than the cost of implementing an agreed rule, a country prefers to respect the rule 
than the reverse, and vice versa. 
The main objective of our analysis is to investigate the role of such commitment tactics 
on the bargaining outcome within a tax competition framework. The following 
hypotheses are made:  
Firstly, each country knows the other's costs of revoking its commitment. Partly, as a 
result of this assumption, the unique equilibrium is always Pareto efficient. In particular, 
in equilibrium, the countries involved do not make incompatible partial commitments.  
Secondly, the model is a two-stage game. In the first stage, the two countries choose their 
respective partial commitments. This can be interpreted as taking place outside the formal 
negotiating process. After such partial commitments become known, the countries enter 
the formal negotiating process in the second stage, and try to reach agreement.   17
Lastly, innovation and/or the creation of new companies does not occur in  either 
countries. We focus on an existing pool of companies that can move from one country to 
another. The goal is to concentrate on the policy changes that can create distortions 
compared with the initial period. 
The model is as an extension to Rubinstein's model  (Rubinstein, 1982), in which the 
bargainers make partial commitments before engaging in the offer-counteroffer process.
2 
The version presented here is inspired by the interpretation of Rubinstein’s model by 
Muthoo (1999), and is explicitly built upon a Nash's bargaining solution. A main focus of 
interest is the nature of the equilibrium in the first stage – the negotiation stage, where 
partial commitments are strategically chosen. In the tax competition versus 
harmonization case, an important issue to study is the circumstances under which, in 
equilibrium, countries make incompatible partial commitments. Hence, although the 
equilibrium at the first stage is influenced by the second stage game, first stage 
equilibrium actions are the focus of interest. 
 
2.2 The players 
 
Two countries,  A and  B, bargain over  how to share a pool of companies, denoted  S  
(where  0 S > ).  
They simultaneously and independently choose numbers from the closed interval [ ] 0,S . 
Let  i c  denote the number chosen by country  i( , iAB = ) that would comply with the 
fiscal objectives of this country. The interpretation is that country  i  takes “actions” 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that this model is one example of the framework of two-stage games of 
``claims' and ``concessions''.   18
which partially commit it to not accept a share strictly less than  i c . A partial commitment 
can later be revoked at some cost to the country.  
The utility  ( ) , iii Usc  of country  i  from obtaining a percentage share  [ ] 0, i sS ˛  of the 
pool of companies, given that the country partially committed itself to  [ ] 0, i cS ˛  (in 
percent), is:  
  ( ) ( ) ,, iiiiiii UscsCsc =- ,  (1) 
 
 
where  ( ) , iii Csc denotes the cost to country  i of revoking its partial commitment  i c  and 
obtaining a share  i s .  
It is assumed that  ( ) , iii Csc if  ii sc ‡ , and that  ( ) ,0 iii Csc >  if  ii sc < .  
More specifically: 











= ￿ - < ￿
  (2) 
 
where  0 a > . The cost is proportional to the difference  ii cs - . Note that  the revoking 
function captures the notion that the cost of revoking a partial commitment is strictly 
increasing to the extent that it is actually revoked. 
 
2.3 The payoffs 
 
Country  i's payoff from a pair of strategies is  ( ) , AB ccc =  by  ( ) i Pc.    19
Let us consider the payoffs when the chosen partial commitments  A c  and  B c  are such 
that  AB ccS + £ . In this case, neither country revokes its partial commitment: the share  i s  
of the pool obtained by country  i is such that  ii sc ‡ . Specifically, the share obtained by 
country  i is given by  ( ) i c l , where  A l  and  B l  are any functions such that  ( ) AA cc l ‡  
and  ( ) ( ) BAB cScc ll =- ‡ .
3 
If  AB ccS + £  agreement over the partition of the pool of companies is struck, at least one 
of the countries must have revoked its partial commitment.  
The set  ( ) c W  of possible utility pairs that can be the outcome of the bargaining process 
is constructed using the set  X  of possible partitions of the pool of companies and the 
utility functions  A U  and  B U , where: 
  ( ) { } ,:0 and  ABABA XsssSsSs = ££=- .  (3) 
 
That is, the set  ( ) c W  is the union of all pairs  ( ) ( ) ( ) ,,, AAABBB UscUsc  for ( ) , AB ssX ˛ .  
Indeed, for each pair  [ ]
2
0, cS ˛  such that  AB ccS +> , the set  ( ) c W  is the graph of the 
function  ( ) .; fc  defined by: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
1 ;;; ABAAAB fucUSUucc
- =- ,  (4) 
 
                                                 
3 For example, it may be assumed that  ( ) ( )/2. iiAB ccScc l =+--  Hence, if  AB ccS + £ , then 
country i’s payoff is:  ( ) ( ) ii Pcc l = .   20
where the domain and range of  ( ) .; fc  are, respectively, the closed intervals [ ] , AA cS a -  
and [ ] , BB cS a - . Notice that  ( ) .; fc  is concave and strictly decreasing in  A u .  
If the countries do not reach agreement, each country obtains a zero payoff, which can be 
called the disagreement point. 
 
2.4 The equilibrium 
 
This section derives the  two Nash equilibriums of the model described above.  Two 
scenarios can be drawn: when players reach agreement in the negotiation stage and when 
they do not. First, when players do not reach agreement  it is possible that there exist 
values of  A c  and  B c  such that  ( ) 0;0 fc £ ; in this case,  ( ) ( ) 0 AB PcPc == . However, if 
( ) 0;0 fc > , then the payoff pair  ( ) ( ) ( ) , AB PcPc  is defined as the Nash bargaining 
solution of the bargaining problem  ( ) ( ) , cd W , with the disagreement point  ( ) 0,0 d = . 












    (5) 
Here, the bargaining process – in other words tax competition – leads to a race to the 
bottom. This is an interesting Nash equilibrium since it opposes the usual results from 
approaches based on non-cooperative games. Indeed, a race to the bottom is not a Nash 
equilibrium in a non-cooperative game.    21
Second of all, players can  reach agreement in the negotiation stage. But in the second 
stage,  two situations can be observed: incompatible commitments and compatible 
commitments. 
 With incompatible commitments, any pair of more-than-compatible partial commitments 
is not a Nash equilibrium, that is if  AB ccS +< , then the pair  ( ) , AB ccc =  is not a Nash 
equilibrium.  There exists an  i  such that  ( ) ( ) ,  ji Sccji l - > „ ; otherwise, 
( ) AB cSc l ‡- and  ( ) BA cSc l ‡- implies that  AB ccS + ‡ . Hence, country  i can benefit 
from a  unilateral  deviation  ij cSc ¢ =- .  A generalization of this result with a 
concave ( ) .; fc is that any pair of incompatible commitments is not a Nash equilibrium. 
Assuming that  ( ) 0;0 fc >  and  ( ) BB Pcc < , then country  B can benefit from a decrease 
in its partial commitment to  BB cce ¢ =-  for some e  such that 0 B c e << . 
With compatible commitments, any pair of exactly-compatible partial commitments that 
does not satisfy a particular condition is not a Nash equilibrium:  when  AB ccS +=  but 
BA cc c „ , where  ( ) ( ) 11 BA caa ”++ , then the pair  ( ) , AB ccc =  is not a Nash 





















.  (6) 
In other words, both countries do not benefit from a unilateral deviation to a partial 
commitment. To see that, suppose country  A unilaterally deviates to 
*
AA cce ¢ =+ , where 
e  is such that 
* 0 A Sc e < £-. The payoff pair is  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, ABAB PcPcPcPc ¢¢ < . In that 
case the deviation is not profitable. The same argument holds true for country  B, which   22
does not benefit from a unilateral deviation to a partial commitment 
*
BB cc ¢ „ . The Nash 
equilibrium is, thus, Pareto-optimal, and since it is a finite-horizon game, it will be 
chosen by backward induction over the first Nash equilibrium found earlier. 
 
3. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
This paper aims to shed light on a very important tax question in a monetary union, 
specifically the Euro-zone: can tax competition between countries lead to a race to the 
bottom? It starts with a traditional empirical analysis of the evolution of taxes in the 
Euroland, both at the level of the zone as a whole, and for each country separately, and 
examines the evolution of the tax burden, and tax burdens on  immobile and mobile 
assets. The data suggest that a race to the bottom does not seem to have, in general, taken 
place in Europe from 1965 to 2003. Yet, these facts do not guarantee that a race to the 
bottom will not happen in the future, especially with the higher degree of integration that 
the European Monetary Union creates over time. 
To study this theoretical question we build a game theoretical model introducing a 
bargaining situation between countries with costs of changing tax policies. 
The model is a two-stage game. It starts with a one shot, static game where the two 
countries agree on how to share total income. In the second stage, the countries enter a 
formal negotiating process and try to reach agreement. A country that would not respect 
its commitment incurs revoking costs.  The existence of these costs is the key element in 
preventing a race to the bottom. Further research in political economy could look at the   23
precise definitions of these costs:  a political end for an incumbent candidate who 
previously decreased public expenditure, the fine of the Stability and Growth Pact, etc. 
Such a fairly abstract model sheds light on the paramount importance of tax policy in 
Europe, and, more generally, in a monetary union. 
The model has two main policy implications. Firstly, it demonstrates that tax competition 
is not likely to lead to a race to the bottom between countries. It brings a theoretical 
argument against the usual fear of a race to the bottom in Europe. 
Secondly, the paper shows that if revoking costs do exist, tax harmonization policies are 
not useful if based upon fears of a race to the bottom,. Advocates of tax harmonization 
should base their reasoning upon other assumptions. Indeed, this does not mean that some 
harmonization policies may not be justified on the basis of optimal policy coordination 
between countries, and for Europe to converge towards an optimum currency area 
(OCA). Except for inequality or welfare concerns, tax competition may also be a 
reasonable way to discipline countries, and to prevent them from facing an increasing 
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